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Sande Cohen
Narrative 
engulfment: the 
public intellectual 
and narrative 
misrepresentation
In Symbolic Economies, J.-J. Goux notes that in-
trinsic to a historicity of money, “once” the latter 
is made a general equivalent, is the process of 
“centristic tendencies”; today, this is called “too 
big to fail”. This phrase is adequate to not just 
finance and labour, but also to art – the emer-
gence of the global “biennale”. Historicity is the 
ascent and triumph of subordinations around 
centrisms and their antagonisms, the money/
commodity schism incessantly linearised, driv-
en by the downcoding of a Hegelian model, the 
“cunning of reason”, into an encoding via what 
the great historiographer Karl Lowith called 
“the wasteful economy of history”, or capital-
ism-live. History as engulfment. Fully devel-
oped capitalist regimes bring “limitless inter-
relation”, what Deleuze and Guattari would call 
breakdowns. The continuous history of capital 
is super-storied as “matter conceived as void of 
sense”, where “pure composition” magnetises 
and funnels subjective, monetary and symbolic 
values towards what today is called consumer-
ism.1 The ultimate “matter” “void of sense” is, of 
course, that black hole called the subject who 
lacks, infinitive form. Lyotard called the psychol-
ogisation of capital the triumph of lack: we are 
not allowed not to lack. (Complementary, Ro-
land Barthes argued that in myth, concepts dis-
tort sense and meaning, or myth produces an-
other kind of lack.) In the face of these two rather 
overwhelming negatives, the organisation of life 
in such societies is regulated by a how-to-ism, 
a radical operationalism of “limitless interrela-
tion”. If “lack” goes with subjectivity, excess goes 
to the dominant: the destruction by the Clinton 
administration of the Glass–Steagall separation 
in 1998, which prevented banks from mixing 
deposits and investments, resulted in surplus 
leveraging, just as surely as China’s underway 
relocation of 250 million farmers into cities is 
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carried out because they are deemed redundant (a blockage) to other profits-to-come. In this, his-
toriography makes itself into an ingredient of both critique and rationalisation, in various mixtures. 
Narratives of change and transformation can just as easily generate misleading notions of continu-
ity as they can of the force of discontinuity. The combinations are multiple: narratives of the avant-
garde in America inflate the radicalism of art-as-discontinuity and narratives of capital deflate the 
discontinuities Americans “receive” from the economy. There are so many comparisons regularly 
churned out by school, government, think tank inter alia, that one can ask why we are not, say, 
flooded with narratives about the number of Americans actually employed, the lowest percentage 
in its “history”, but such small narratives are shelved on the margins. 
Historical narration requires a plunge – one narrates from vast amounts and intensities of infor-
mation and data with their attending (or dominant) interpretations and returns, surfaces, with a 
procedure of present orientation – that may or may not be more than a further rationalisation of a 
particular subject. I am speaking of academic writing, i.e. narratives of globalisation that emphasise 
positive continuity and de-emphasise social discontinuity. In mass-writing, the New York Times has 
run continuous stories about the American civil war for a few years now, keeping its “presence” 
alive as a decisive continuity which sustains current political topics, i.e. racism in America. But criti-
cal historiography notices that the past returned to a now is a deeply political formation – making 
the now continuous with a present is already a command, even if softly couched in the discourse 
of drawing lessons. Promises “from history” are highly questionable. As will be discussed, to name 
the 2008 exposure of financial explosions/implosions a “crisis”, from which were issued forth the 
polarity of austerity versus spending as narrative choices, is already containment and misleading. 
So let me start with the notion that critical historiography in a here and now has to ask how groups-
in-conflict use history for control: Levi-Strauss’ question, history for whom?
This essay is directed to a here and now, its subject the resuscitation of mainstream American lib-
eralism’s narrative of the Great Recession, almost universally “dated” from 2008 with the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in New York. Great Recession is a vicarious substitution, hence already located 
by comparison with the Depression of 1929, but downcoded – less negative, less severe. Overnight, 
this dated event/process was immediately narrated as the avoidance of a Second Great Depres-
sion. It was, via astounding degrees of media attention (including scholarly ones), a historiographic 
catastrophe – the processes that generated the said “crisis” are still those of the dominant econo-
my; massive reconstitutions of capital continue to flow into whatever and wherever they can; his-
toriography was mostly not used to provoke criticism. In the critique which follows, this “now” has 
been put to rueful narrative functions; the primary one, that of narrative continuity, restored to and 
from this “crisis”, in which avoidance-as-event created narratives that void, rather than open to, an 
extensive analysis of other processes. The period under consideration – 2008 to today – is read as 
wildly contentious processes and actions brought under control. What follows then is an analysis 
and discussion of narrative terror – the use of narrative to both softly (but relentlessly) frighten a 
population (here, readers of the New York Times, a population of spectators) and give rationalisa-
tions over the quantity of time necessary for putting into place techniques that have managed to 
control labour, money, and much more. The American political system, and not only that, has put 
in place devices and techniques, from law to invitations to a new subjectivity (i.e. reality television 
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humiliations), to have made notions such as recovery and avoidance collective rationalisations, es-
capes, displacements, integrations, and, yes, still more. So the actual “subject” here is the politics 
of narrative. Narrative is always a political tactic: because stories are used to name, date, include, 
exclude, elevate and distort, leave in/leave out. 
In societies riven by conflict, historical narratives rarely set forth the breaking of social rules and 
conditions, one version of this brilliantly sketched by Vico. In the course of events, he argued, “‘ob-
stinate factions’ and ‘desperate civil wars’” employ the “barbarism of reflection” or otherwise per-
petuate conditions of relentless subjective irony transferred to every level/type of existence.2 In this, 
historical consciousness remains pinned to offering reflection that is no value at all. Or, worse: such 
narrative-driven consciousness offers reflection that continues barbarism, one “more barbarous 
than primitive savagery, inasmuch as it is unrestricted by the fear and ignorance” of earlier mo-
ments.3 One of the themes of this essay is the “barbarism of the smart”, that is, the relentless suc-
cess, across every mainstream institution, of the binary of austerity/spending, which operates as 
an anti-intellectual (critical) tool, hinged to a narrative of recovery that is systematically misleading. 
The modalities of historical consciousness may have bearings initiated in a present, but may return 
to render tomorrow in systematic modes of self-deception. Martin Davies has called this a condition 
of historicisation: narratives are rendered that make “present prehension [aesthesis]” controlled by 
“extensive abstraction”, which brings with it redundancy, fundamentalism, and despondency.4 I do 
not think I have to stress that thousands of books and tens of thousands of journalistic articles have 
made current economic conditions representable, but overwhelmingly narrated in the name of ex-
isting powers, of all sorts. The “barbarism of reflection” Vico alluded to is just the transformation 
of information and knowledge into the force of management by those who already wield consider-
able control, including new ones. I first discuss some philosophical–critical notions of capital/ism, 
to ensure that the analysis of mainstream economic narratives is located in necessarily contestable 
set(s) of relations. Then I have some comments on what constitutes a “public intellectual”, the one, 
the who, that changes public “opinion”, makes a difference. And from there, I sail, with Kant’s ver-
sion of Captain Cook, into the somewhat twisted harbour of the New York Times and Paul Krugman.
Let’s start with what should be obvious but commonly obscured: every concept in contemporary 
economics is, speaking in the idiom of food, half-baked – the plurality of discursive and institutional 
uses makes it impossible to present economics as conceptually intact. Every concept considered 
autonomously economic belongs at once to its significatory classes and kinds, or concepts that 
provide operations of identification and yet are often further de-territorialisations: the derivative 
market calls itself secondary (derivative as adjective and adverb), but it is also primary in actual 
practices. Economic concepts, definitions and the like are not free from the semiotically encoded 
vicarious substitutions and delegations of specific actions. Every conjunction between, say, money-
as-bill payment and power-as-capital testifies to this. In semiotic terms, the concepts discussed 
below are simultaneously over- and under-coded, contextualised and de-contextualising. To give 
powerful and stable names to things and relata is to impose order that is all the way through un-
stable. The arts and humanities, if one likes, live on such relations. So rather than start directly with 
analysis of the New York Times and its main economic writer, I should like to begin with a critical 
mode of historiographic perspective. 
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First, taking into account new types of violence in the social system – here, for example, the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, one can refer to arguments about the movement from produc-
tion to reproduction. These are “loaded” terms, without doubt, but suggest, in line with arguments 
made by Baudrillard, that go to the dissolve of symbolic codes replaced by semiotic ones. This is 
capital conceived through a “structural law of value”, as Baudrillard’s Symbolic Exchange and Death 
(1976) put it, a hyper-reality of societies in which every action is subject to a “generalised manipula-
tion”.5 Capitalist practices micrologise, for instance, in the emergence of fees for small things or the 
transfer of services from providers to users. Notions of production, value, worth, equivalence, fair-
ness, recovery, stasis and the like are made functionally mythical in regimes where sign- exchange 
value rules – labour reproduces itself in a repetition of commutable signs within an operational 
rather than a significatory field. A labour degree-zero? The famous current CEO salary that is 400 
times the worker’s income is based on codes of service, which has little to do with labour-time.6 
Service means many things, one of them protection of the power to expand. As Baudrillard ar-
gued, the “fundamental mentality of capital” towards labour may well have been organised as in-
vestment/wages for workers, but now frantic activity and perpetual crisis (cf. Spain, Greece, De-
troit) open not as indices to “criteria of equivalence” but rather to relentless speculation.7 Nothing, 
it seems, remains of any distinctive labour theory of value, despite important attempts to sustain 
it.8 It would also seem that every philosophy of history which talks about outcomes, goals, ends, 
aims, means and the like is condemned to notions of growth or “production for production’s sake” 
that involves the reinvestment of interest (surplus); money truly has no equivalent as it “plays” out 
in “transfers and writings, according to an incessant splitting and increase of its own abstract sub-
stance.”9 What does money measure? Eric Alliez, writing in Capital Times, has a completely dif-
ferent time-point for capital – already in ancient Greece, money became a device of “appropriating 
expropriation” or where the “aberration movement” (synthesised in Benjamin Franklin’s “money 
is time”) allowed “money [to be] torn from its political condition of mediating need to become the 
number of an artificial and convulsive movement”.10 It was interest, according to Alliez, that brings 
with it “the homogeneration of time, the register of an abstract, infinitely divisible time”. “Surplus 
value of code into a surplus value of flux,” wrote Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, so that mon-
ey was split into payment for consumption (wages) and money used to speculate – “a prospective 
force or . . . long-term evaluation, not realisable hic et nunc.”11 Formations of money, for example 
exchange money and credit money, do not have a “common measure”, so that temporal relations 
reproduce ceaseless displacements between money and commodity.12 
No less problematic than money and economic concepts is the mystery of intellectual critique. In 
discussing, below, Krugman’s texts and their location in the New York Times, it is impossible not 
to ask about public life. Can a critical narrative of these texts do more than indicate their intellectual 
value or their political positioning? In an essay, “The Public as Phantom”, Bruce Robbins notes that 
evocations of a competent, informed, collective or mass “public” has always been a phantasma-
goria in America, “an attempt to haunt us with the Spirit of the Past, an authoritative survival be-
fore which we should bow down in fear, awe, and silence”.13 For Robbins, a left as such cannot do 
without invocations of a “public” even if the latter only exists as phantom. The vitality of the phan-
toms, it can be said, are now circulated mostly in academic and art domains, itself a confirmation 
of intensively riven vicarious relations, of every type and kind. In these places, there is still what 
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Robbins calls a demand for politicisation that might be critical, but there is plenty of confusion by 
invoking a “public” without analysis of its “actual goals and values”; progressivism has tended to 
replace critique with expression, with inclusion of “other identities”. A close reading of Krugman’s 
use of narrative should illumine such topics.
Like the vast majority of Americans, I was a spectator at the media presentation of the financial tur-
moil that became explicit in 2008, turmoil fed by and saturated by various mediations. Enough dis-
course came from every direction to generate competitions over difficulties of representation, espe-
cially issues of the narrative incorporation of actual processes (i.e. an imploding stock market). The 
tribulations of a shrinking American middle-class came forward, including much incomprehension 
of contemporary economic practices. Multiple wars over narration did not, of course, predominate 
so as to generate systematic upheaval in relation to “public” life – five years later, there is no pub-
lic discourse that stands opposed to the fix-it-up and patch-it-up actions of economic activity and 
narrative presentation. Important and initial mediatised representations of financial mayhem came 
during the Obama and McCain debates. At one point, they were asked what defined middle-class, 
heading straight for the territory of class trouble. Without missing a beat, they agreed that an income 
of $250,000 per year was the upper-threshold of middle-class. I watched this debate in Phichit, Thai-
land, with Thai teachers – who were stunned, since they knew that the median household income of 
Americans is $50,000; what kind of political–numerical magic had taken hold in America? How could 
Americans listen to such narrative appropriations of descriptive fictions? Be that as it may, from the 
moment “too big to fail” was issued forth as the state response, issues of dependency, debt, con-
sumption and much more were recalibrated; narratively, the freezing of credit was instantly a scare 
story: what if people could not borrow? That, in turn, belongs to a possibly more disturbing narrative 
of debt – the “fuel” which makes for a future (tomorrow), since today one’s subjective present (pres-
ence) involves so much future speculation. In the sense of Arthur Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of 
History, “too big to fail” is a temporal structure – the phrase serves as criteria by which different so-
cial agents and actors, including institutions, can pick and choose narrative sentences by means of 
which significance is assigned to events at earlier and later moments. Which certainly means oth-
er processes and events can be disregarded. As Danto put it, “words like ‘fatal’, ‘destined’, ‘doom’, 
dramatise what is an essential fact about the historical organisation of the past”. “Too big to fail” also 
served as a narrative ethos – stories of debt, success, impasse, failure, recovery and the like were 
given sense – stories of woe and advantage, fairness and injustice, and much more, easily fit with 
the dramatics of “too big to fail”. Thus, “too big” immediately led to narratives of “recovery” insofar 
as a kind of solvency was promised, one of the oldest and well-worn illusions of collective identity. 
From a critical perspective, 2008 was worded-up as an immense spectacle of patching. 
The stories told, most drawn from pre-existing narratives, turned actualities into discourse, into 
wordedness. With exceptions, the strange locution that a “2nd Great Depression” had been avoided 
by state action took hold, with the media and highly visible commentators telling us the federal gov-
ernment “knew” it had only a few days to provide a backstop after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
Apart from a few commentators who argued for no state intervention – widely associated with let-
ting banks and other institutions dissolve, a call for narrative rupture, and located by mainstream 
mediators as libertarian (or worse) – there was a quickly dominant narrative rush, an exceeding-
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ly political action that turned narration into a weapon. With historicisation one of the stakes, or the 
processing of the contemporary into narrated duration, the effective capture of wildly different ex-
periences and interpretations also dominated. The narrative of avoidance “won”; what did not hap-
pen (2nd Depression) thus “happened”. The success of an absence is a strange cultural-intellectual 
phenomenon. As with every narrative, criteria have to be offered so as to select actions, process-
es and projects which are, again in Danto’s terms, “changes . . . nested within changes, and stories 
[that] require increasingly complex middles to explain the outermost change”. He illustrated this as: 
(( ) ( ( )) () ), which visually alludes to multiple causation, overdetermination, and narrative overlap.14 
“Avoided” was differently placed – at once a terminus, a result and a beginning, but also a possible 
“middle” of other stories (i.e. a pause in financial chaos) as well as a “beginning” of an ending not 
written. Unfortunately, Danto also stressed that “social inheritance” frequently allows one to use 
concepts “built up over the generations” so that we explain “avoidance” and “too big to fail” through 
“immediacy and certitude.” The certainty of “too big” joined to “avoidance” seems to have encoded 
satisfaction from “avoidance”, a narrative generating a pause in social contention. “Too big to fail” and 
“avoidance” were not thought of and acted on as “unprecedented” and cannot be explained, I think, 
except by the observation that acceptance of the concept of “avoidance” was also a suppression of 
aspects of social reality deemed too intractable to deal with. Danto thought we have no option but 
to explain change via conventions that “like events have like causes” or “constant conjunctions”.15 
While it seems incontestable that Danto’s affirmation of Humean causal analysis is widely accepted, 
it seems to me that if narrative sentences assign significance to some events and processes and 
consigns others to a sort of oblivion, “like” and “constant” are precisely ideological forms. To even call 
2008 a financial “crisis” built around the concept of “too big to fail” is to bring to 2008 a vast discursive 
arrangement – the entire historiography of financial-social disturbance, surprise, the unexpected, 
where the “normal” (what is held to be “normal”) has actually upended itself, while it was also used 
to set off a restoration of the “normal. “Like” and “constant” are meta tags of an identitarian order. 
Here, one can note that “too big to fail” has been from the start shadowed by “recovery”, that some-
what creepy sense of redragged into actions of return and repetition of the normal. From the per-
spective of what Danto called temporal placement, the fusion of “too big to fail” and “recovery” or 
past-referring descriptions that are also future-evoking statements, swamped present-tensed 
conflict: instead of “avoidance of a 2nd Great Depression” evaluated as a, say, Lyotardian differend, 
where events are made to go into discourses that cannot be mastered or that open to what dis-
course releases as incommensurable, one receives redundancy. As a Lyotardian differend, “too big 
to fail” and “avoidance”, open to an abyss, on the one hand the vast ignorance of capital in the US 
and the equally vast conformities of acceptance of that ignorance. From any metahistorical per-
spective, there is something peculiar that belongs to the dominant narratives. What present eco-
nomic reality is about, including processes not readily available to the “general population”, did not 
receive much narrative treatment; what happened was the installation of a continuous narrative 
in which “avoidance” was the escape hatch for what is now an endless stream of stories, many 
encoded as beautiful data in those university generated charts and graphs which give a ceaseless 
visual supply of misleading comparisons.
A kind of collective sensibility was achieved, that the present is one of continuous time relations, 
even though many groups immediately felt the discontinuous, or future-differences. The suture 
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of past and present was accomplished through a dominant media and institutional reiteration of a 
narrative with a large number of substories, images, concepts, and a lot more. What did not hap-
pen – a 2nd Depression – became the informing content and substance. The internet amplified 
the “real” of this and produced its own distortions, especially, as said, a vast number of charts and 
graphs showing just about every possible combination of depth and scale: 1929 to 2008, endless 
comparisons, a kind of horror of comparison, each one relentless in its “facticity” or claim to ac-
curacy, to disclose a piece of the real. Insofar as any comparison is an opportunity for ideological 
self-confirmation, as well as for a serious misrepresentation, intellectual collateral damage from 
the “too big” inter alia has been severe. 
And the discourses were unequal: the statements of a Federal Reserve chief were hardly on the 
same level as statements made by millions of ordinary citizens who, in jokes, worries, editorials, 
everyday conversations and the like, circulated “too big to fail” in a phased movement (narrative) 
from a bureaucratic discourse that refers to operational efficacy to senses and images of both pop-
ular satisfaction and malaise. Time magazine featured Bernanke as a “hero” of capital, where the 
notion of avoidance was joined to a real oxymoron, the positive failure of another Great Depression. 
In sum, “too big to fail” coils more than one narrative or story, not least the sense that the “heads” 
of society are relatively untouchable, as it also involves a sense of mass-fatalism – an impossibil-
ity of difference. The phrase evoked some scepticism, but without force – as I write this (May 2013), 
the financial system as a whole does pretty much what it wants, including a recent amendment 
to congressional financial regulations (Dodd–Frank) directly written into law by Citibank attorneys. 
It is worth saying here that while notions of process and discourse are entirely contestable, it is 
a fact on the ground that assigning common causality and responsibility was immediately made 
irrelevant unless there was (is) undeniable law-breaking; devoid of a legal process having mas-
sively intervened, financiers such as George Soros still say such things like “Financial crises are not 
caused by speculators, but by the authorities, which create or establish the wrong rules that allow 
speculators to do what people blame them for. In other words, to put it more clearly, speculators 
are messengers delivering bad news.”16 That’s an astoundingly self-serving rhetorical blowtorch 
– how can Soros get away with saying such things? Because his discourse is “too big to fail”? Le-
gal discourse, including how laws have been written to protect the “too big to fail”, did not capture 
the narrative of “too big to fail” – the narrative of that is another story, of escape from responsibil-
ity by means of “the law”.
Unequal discourse – Soros’ statements widely circulated, given impact and repetition in their sheer 
irresponsibility or displacement of responsibility, that concept suffocated by social position and the 
abuse of the law, joins with the narrative of the avoidance and then failure of Great Depression 2 
– and overlaps with financial dominations that have a life of their own. In sum, “too big to fail” was 
institutionalised in bailouts inter alia, one of its senses given privilege over others. The phrase was 
differently activated – a marker of technocratic “speak”, a jargon, but one with a large reach. 
Now, asking, with Robbins’ comments about a/the public and phantoms, Krugman’s stories and 
op-eds in the New York Times opinion pages offer no shortage of large and small narratives of in-
equality, poverty, job loss, restructuring of the American economy inter alia, particularly as they 
stay away from issues of income, gouging and outright financial manipulation – unless heavily 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 07/06/2020 15:36:16 |
Narrative engulfment: the public intellectual and narrative misrepresentation
14
dramatised, as with the Bernie Madoff “case”. Overall, Krugman’s op-ed columns and blog force 
continuity between the Democratic Party and its progressive wing, which amounts to a defence of 
“cheap” money and Keynesian spending in periods of slump and recession. He has devoted many 
columns to the obvious truism of stupidity among some Republicans, most of which read as cher-
ry picking; a relentless focus on the distribution of wealth to the 0.1 or 1 percent of wealth holders 
displaces any analysis of the wage surplus in the US, that is, for example that student loans in the 
University of California system first pay California bond interest, or that academia as such is now 
70–75 percent part-time labour vis. an increasingly remote tenure group; the model of New York 
high-life is the mark of the civilised who have “earned” their privilege, including the “good academ-
ic” who practices enlightened social science, in general promoting the reproductive procedures 
of Democratic candidates in public life. In sum, a kind of Clintonism, with university and financial 
overlap – a process in which institutions, academics, policies, writing laws, enacting regulations or 
otherwise setting up tactics and strategies that retain control not of the 1% übers, but of the next 
11–15 percent below, that $250,000 “middle-class” figure shared by McCain and Obama in 2008.
Here is Krugman’s narrative version of the story (myth, fiction, model, concept) of “too big to fail”: 
The story, at this point, is fairly straightforward. The financial crisis led, through several chan-
nels, to a sharp fall in private spending: residential investment plunged as the housing bubble 
burst; consumers began saving more as the illusory wealth created by the bubble vanished, 
while their mortgage debt remained. And this fall in private spending led, inevitably, to a global 
recession. For an economy is not like a household. A family can decide to spend less and try 
to earn more. But in the economy as a whole, spending and earning go together: my spending 
is your income; your spending is my income. If everyone tries to slash spending at the same 
time, incomes will fall – and unemployment will soar.17
Notice that the link between “crisis” and “illusory wealth” is utterly cancelled by the stress on “econ-
omy as a whole”, a fiction of the synecdochic kind – that there is a “whole” rather than a more dis-
quieting narrative to which “all” cannot apply. And notice as well that the equation which makes 
for recovery is the identity of not-spending – so that now it is spending that is “too big to fail”. That 
Krugman’s use of history-as-narration infantilises is not, I think, contestable. Disturbingly, the ed-
itorials offer a bridge between academic culture and daily life of ordinary people in which critical 
analysis tends to be buried in academic journal literature, some of which at least tends to pose 
problems and not solutions.18 For Krugman, over and again, narrative recovery, or recovering the 
narrative of fulfilment, takes up 2008 and after: 2008 created “inadequate demand” or consump-
tion as narrative thwarted. On the subject of many years of asset price inflation, including homes 
and college tuitions, combined with wage stagnation for the majority of workers, Krugman sends 
forth narrative mystification, the refusal to explain. Thus, acknowledging that “finance economists 
rarely asked the seemingly obvious (though not easily answered) question of whether asset prices 
made sense given real-world fundamentals like earnings. Instead they asked only whether asset 
prices made sense given other asset prices,” Krugman puts speculators, investors, or just about 
everyone, including academic economists implicated in this “great inequality”, in the same bin: “The 
belief in efficient financial markets blinded many if not most.” Explanation by blindness of course 
affirms a kind of infirmity to society, or “blinded” comes to mean the “system” is “too big to see”?19
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Since 2008, Krugman and the New York Times have especially repelled a critique on the morali-
sation of the financial nastiness – lessening the chances for a critical analysis between the legal 
and the ethical. “Too big to fail” has been radically demoralised in favour of narratives that sustain 
the very processes of which “too big” is both cause and effect; the chief narrative being that con-
sumer society requires liquidity provided by the very powers that cannot fail. It isn’t any more so-
phisticated, as a semiotic notion, not a technical one, than a Bangkok taxi driver saying “no money, 
no honey”. In this, the New York Times has tried to stabilise economic discourse and provide sup-
port for certain processes over others. In a general sense, all of the primary editorial writers in the 
Times radically deflate the negative or recode it. For example, mass suicides by Foxconn workers 
in China in 2010 did not deter Friedman from continuing to extol China as a “marvel”; David Brooks 
regularly cites “social scientific” research in psychology so as to affirm the “essential” soundness 
of the American Dream; Frank Rich ran a story on the death of diplomat Richard Holbrooke, ne-
glecting to mention that Holbrooke’s behaviour in East Timor (1975–80) abetted the Indonesian 
slaughter there; Stanley Fish spreads irony as if his readers shared irony as life’s only existential 
condition. So I don’t think there is a question that the main editorial writers at the New York Times 
favour a historiography that maintains, in general, what Bourdieu called the “liberal professions” 
protected by “legitimate distance, established by academic verdicts . . . by meritocratic indignation” 
so as to privilege a certain kind of narrative, that progress incorporates and overcomes destruc-
tion of all kinds.20 In other words, progressive narrative hews to a teleology instead of a critique, 
which gives it the sense of an illusionistic general history. The visitations of increased structural 
poverty to many social groups is decried but, at the same time, the only politics allowed are those 
of the two parties whose very modes of reproduction have generated the contemporary waste-
land of politics.21
Krugman attributes the financial crisis to “debt that households ran up” rather than the massive 
leveraging by institutions like Lehman, which at one point before collapse had debts 33 times its 
assets. Because recovery is a narrative process, the ongoing requirement is for the state to con-
test “deflation, not inflation, [which] is the clear and present danger”. From the outset, Krugman has 
given no systematic analysis of the run-up in housing prices that continued from the mid-1970s to 
the present; even in deflated markets like Riverside, California; or Arizona or Florida, prices were 
markedly higher than average wages over this period. So why is deflation the problem? To say de-
flation is the number one targeted enemy of progressive economics, the narration informs itself 
– past inflations are not to be contested; it is quite paranoid that there should be no going back on 
previous inflations. This precludes analysis of what even basic statistics indicates, that the move-
ment of income to the “top” is real and a mask for the more diffuse economy of services, which 
involves the professional classes in gouging, in exploitation. In actuality, conflict within the middle 
class is ruled out. In editorial after editorial, it is a given that “governments should be spending while 
the private sector won’t, so that debtors can pay down debts without perpetuating a global slump”. 
What matters, again, is narrative joined to rhetoric: the call for “debt relief” is only to ensure that 
debt continues – to prevent that nihilistic outcome, aka bankruptcies. To make debt payable locks 
in debt just as prior inflations are locked in. A critical narrative of inflation and “bubbles” ruled out, 
Krugman avoids the systematic, or simply the differential of the social, i.e. the switch from guaran-
teed pensions from the 1960s to 80s and their replacement by volatile 401s. The stories reiterated 
in the New York Times instead emphasise a “deflationary trap”, less spending and less borrowing, 
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hence less employment, a narrative of labour treated in its most Dantoesque dramatic form: the 
frightfulness of unemployment. Fear is the architecture of narrative when it comes to unemploy-
ment – but only in a swerve from the more difficult analysis, if not genealogy of cost/price/prof-
it/surplus, the complex of monetary forms of terror.22 In this, Krugman’s relentless invocation of 
Keynesian spending versus the austerity model has come to serve for the progressive wing of the 
Democratic Party as their sole economic touchstone. It is surely highly political that Krugman’s 
rhetoric emphasises separating country and family vis-à-vis what is the necessity of paying off debt 
for the latter and spending for the former, while insisting “my and your” spending is transferable, 
conceptually and practically, into the other. The schism of money and commodity discussed at the 
beginning is here confirmed by Krugman’s rather schizophrenic rhetoric. Is Lawrence Summers’ 
half-a-million fee for sitting on corporate boards really an effect of my income as spent? “My and 
your” is insisted as signifying an “our”, as in common economy. But is there such a thing? 
Synthesised many times since 2008, here is a last and particularly striking version, drawing on 
economic history directly, a continuous antecedent, in which labour is as severely controlled as it 
is extolled. First, “if the real problem is that we overspent and lived beyond our means, we should 
be working harder, not throwing millions of people into unemployment”. This bit of a return of the 
past, of its inflations not deniable, it is still employment which is the touchstone – it is presumed 
that any wage is better than nothing. This is yet another encoding of social terror – an intensifica-
tion of labour, its devaluation. Second, a relentless defence of federal spending or taking on debt is 
required, and history is directly called upon: “In fact, when people used to refer to austerity Britain, 
they were referring to the half-dozen years after the war when Britain had very high public debt . . . 
There were exchange controls. There was financial repression. All very terrible things, unaccept-
able by modern standards, right? But there was full employment!” Thus, a positive past, a basis of 
comparison: “and everyone worked hard – but, you know, everyone had a job. We’ve responded to 
much lower levels of debt by ensuring that the economy functions far below potential, millions of 
people who want to work can’t find jobs, and many people see all their hopes for the future slip-
ping away.”23 The stunning reduction – “everybody had a job” – is here turned into a narrative condi-
tion for a rejection of austerity as well as into a condition of existence of American society – neatly 
wrapped, enfolded and encoded, in terror. And one notes this is a safe opposition for mainstream 
liberalism – the opposition between “rentier” and the “unemployed”, in which liberalism cannot lose. 
The “excessive” (the 0.1 to 10.0 of economic class fractions) versus the nearly apocalyptically en-
coded unemployable: “catering almost exclusively to the interests of rentiers – those who derive 
lots of income from assets, who lent large sums of money in the past, often unwisely, but are now 
being protected from loss at everyone else’s expense”. What is narrated is the loss of spendability, 
falling out of consumption, falling out. This is close to what Lyotard, previously referred to, consid-
ered the performance of lack, nonconsumption. Alternatives are presumably senseless. So rather 
than cogent analysis of how “too big to fail” came to be, Krugman targets: the Republican Party is 
the narrative home of the 0.1–1.0 percent, the rentiers, and the rest of the society is relieved from 
any narrative in which self-implication might be discussed.24
Thus, “too big” and related notions are not only a condition of existence, a process and an event 
but also an event of historical narration – the stories told by Krugman, redundant in the extreme –
which deliver the product of the irrelevance of history to social understanding.
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